Published
- 4 min read
By Allan D - Editor, AI Security Wire
One Trailing Dot: Visual Studio and SSMS Copilot RCE, CVE-2026-103572
A single period at the end of a filename was enough to break a Copilot safeguard in Visual Studio and SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS). The researcher behind Embrace The Red (wunderwuzzi) says that a check meant to stop Copilot from rewriting its own configuration files could be sidestepped by writing .mcp.json. instead of .mcp.json. Microsoft shipped a fix on 13 October 2026 as CVE-2026-103572. The write-up is still worth a look. Our assessment: the bug class applies to far more than one IDE.
What the bug is
Copilot in Visual Studio and SSMS runs with tools that can edit files. Some files are off limits without confirmation: the MCP server configuration and the IDE settings files, because changing them changes what the IDE will launch. The researcher says the check lives in EditsFunctionHandler.GetEditConfirmationTypeAsync inside Microsoft.VisualStudio.Copilot.Core.dll, a DLL shared by both products.
The check compares the requested filename against the protected names. Windows, though, ignores trailing dots when it opens a file through the usual Win32 APIs. So .mcp.json. is a different string from .mcp.json, passes the check, and then lands on the protected file. He also reports a second bypass: paths that start inside the trusted Extensions directory and then use ..\ to climb out of it.
From file write to command execution
Once Copilot can rewrite its own configuration, the chain is short. Per the write-up, a hijacked or misaligned agent can add a malicious command as an MCP server in .mcp.json, enable it in enabledMcpServers, and then watch the IDE launch it. In Visual Studio there is a second route: a ripgrep path setting in settings.VisualStudio.json can point at any binary, which then runs the next time Copilot performs a search. The proof of concept in the post pops calc.exe.
For SSMS the settings file sits under a per-installation folder. The researcher found that the path traversal bug let Copilot read SSMS.isolation.ini, which discloses the installation ID needed to build that path. He also reports that the attack works through indirect prompt injection, with content that enters the chat from a file or an MCP server tool result. His demo uses Microsoft’s MAI-Code-1-Flash model, which he says seems to have quite poor injection resilience. That is his observation of one model, not a general measurement.
Scoring and status
The record details come from several places, and they do not describe the same thing in the same way.
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Severity | Important, remote code execution | Microsoft, as relayed by the researcher |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.8, vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NVD entry, source [email protected], labelled Secondary |
| Weakness | CWE-94, code injection | CVE record and NVD |
| Affected | VS 2022 17.14 before 17.14.42; VS 2026 18.10 before 18.10.4 | CVE record and NVD |
| NVD status | Awaiting Analysis (as of our check on 17 Nov) | NVD |
| CISA KEV | Not listed in the feed dated 13 Nov 2026 | CISA |
Two notes. First, the official description says “unauthorized attacker … over a network” and uses a code injection weakness, while the researcher’s root cause is a path validation bypass in an agent. Both can be true of the same flaw, but the label does not tell a defender how it happens. The CVE record’s title and description do not mention Copilot, MCP or path validation. The link between this CVE and the bug described here is the researcher’s. Second, the fixed version numbers above come from the CVE and NVD records.
Disclosure ran from 4 August to Patch Tuesday on 13 October, per the researcher. He also says Microsoft awarded a $0 bounty because the issue was out of scope, and says it was the third vulnerability in two months that led to a patch but was not rewarded. That is his account, and we have not seen a Microsoft response.
What to do
- Update Visual Studio 2022 to 17.14.42 or later and Visual Studio 2026 to 18.10.4 or later. Confirm the SSMS build in the Microsoft advisory.
- Review MCP servers enabled in
.mcp.jsonand in the settings files on developer workstations. Unexpected servers or a changed ripgrep path are worth investigating. - Treat any agent that can write its own configuration as a containment boundary that needs path canonicalization. The researcher’s reading of the patch is that it seems to add a
GetFullPathcall, which removes the dot and normalizes the filename. We have not seen Microsoft’s description of the fix. - Our assessment: audit your own agent tooling for the same pattern, a string comparison on a path that the operating system later normalizes. Windows trailing dots, short names and alternate data streams are the usual suspects.
References
Frequently Asked Questions
- Which versions of Visual Studio are affected by CVE-2026-103572?
- The NVD and CVE records list Visual Studio 2022 version 17.14 before 17.14.42 and Visual Studio 2026 version 18.10 before 18.10.4. The CVE title also names SQL Server Management Studio, but the affected-version data we saw does not list SSMS builds. The researcher says the flaw sits in a shared Copilot DLL used by both products. Check the Microsoft advisory for SSMS build numbers.
- Is CVE-2026-103572 being exploited in the wild?
- As of 17 November 2026, we found no evidence of exploitation in the CISA KEV catalog (JSON feed dated 13 November 2026) or in the CISA SSVC entry in NVD, which lists exploitation as none as of 13 October. The public write-up includes a proof of concept, so absence from KEV is not a reason to delay the update.
- Does this need a malicious user, or can a document trigger it?
- The researcher reports an indirect prompt injection route: attacker-controlled content that reaches the Copilot chat, such as a file the user opens or data returned from an MCP server, can steer the agent into the file writes. The user still has to interact with that content, which, in our assessment, is consistent with the UI:R (user interaction required) element in the published CVSS vector.